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La.tin America in Depression, 1929-1939 
Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro* 
Yale University 
'Ihe 1930s are widely regarded as a crucial turning point in La.tin 
American development: it marks the start of :1mport substituting indus­
trialization and of public policy clearly carrmitted to growth and other 
social objectives. The contrast between "before and after 1929" is often 
exaggerated., but there is little doubt that the events of the 1930s 
have profoundly influenced the region's attitudes toward foreign trade 
and finance. It has been generally recognized that several Latm 
American countries performed "reasonably well" during the Great Depression 
of this century., and different hypotheses have been advanced to explain 
such behavior. Perhaps the flashiest one has been that of Andre Gunder 
Frank., who arg-..,es that the La.tin American 1930s demonstrate that contrary 
to neoclassical orthodoX"J the Periphery industrializes and prospers only 
when the Center is weak and unable to :maintain its :imperial and under­
developing dominance)! Also influenced by the Latin J!merican experience 
during world wars and depressions., Albert 0. Hirschman had earlier noted 
that fluctuations in foreig!'l exchange receipts of less developed countries 
may set in motion certain valuable development mechar..isms. 21 Alexander 
Kafka referred to the Great Depression as a11 example of growth-promoting 
disequilibrium under sane La.tin American c:LT'Cumstances; in a manner 
similar to H:!.rschrr.a~ he conjectured that there is an optimum degree 
of adverse shock, without :1mplying that an adverse shock is better 
than a favorable one.~
) I 
In \o.'hat follows the rr.agn.itude of the shock of the Great Depression 
to Latin A'T.erica will first he documented. Secondly, the policies 
-2-
adopted to cope with the crisis will be discussed. Then the performance 
of various La.tin American economies will be explored, and the sense 
1n which they did reasonably well will be analyzed. Sundry observations 
will close the paper. 
Fran the outside Latin .American countries may all look the same 
but the region, even in the late 1920s, contained a variety of open 
econanies sorne of which were less open and more industrialized than 
others. Indeed, the 1930s witnessed different economic responses which 
can be divided between those of small or passive and those of large 
or active-econor.u.es. Even though statistical documentation for passive 
~ountries is scantier than for active ones, this typological point will 
be of importance throughout the paper. 
Shocks 
For a mnnber of exporters of primary products the late 1920s had 
been difficult ye?,rs~ but on the whole it is useful to picture that 
period as one of reasonable balance of payments equilibrit.nn in the major 
Latin .Arrerican countries. A series of violent external shocks during 
1929-33 disrupted that equilibrit.nn, and inuch of the economic history 
for the 1930s can be written around attempts to adjust the balance of 
payments, and then the domestic economy, to the new environment. 
The collapse of the world economy during 1929-33 was transmitted 
to Latin America first of all by a sharp change in relative prices: 
dollar export prices fell more steeply than dollar import prices. As 
can be seen in Panel A of Table 1, within four years the tenns of 
trade fell by 21 to ~5 percent m countries for which comparable data 
are available.2,/ Note that for a country with a ratio of exports to 
Gross National Product of thirty percent a deterioration of the 
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terms of trade by thirty percent would represent a loss in real incorne 
of nine percent, ·assuming no change in physical output. As a first 
approximation the deterioration of the terms of trade during 1929-33, 
as well as their subsequent evolution in the 1930s may be regarded 
as primarily exogenous to the Latin American economies.§! 
F.xcept for the spectacular Chilean case, for the countries shown 
in Table 1 the contraction in the export quantum during 1929-1933 was 
substantially less than the terms of trade deterioration. By the 
late 1930s the export quantum of several countries had surpassed the 
1928-29 level, but for most countries the terms of trade for 1938-
39 remained below - relative to pre--Oepression magnituoes. Latin 
American exports were predominantly rural and mining products,·the 
former showing a smaller price~lasticity of supply than the latter; 
sane rural products, such as coffee and livestock, also followed sm. 
generis output cycles rooted in their productive characteristics. 
External demand conditions were not uniformly negative for all primary 
products, particularly during the late 1930s; Brazilian cotton, Argentine 
corn, and Peruvian gold are exanples of favored staples. Such ccmrodity 
lottery riat;urally influenced the pace of recovery. 
Table 2-A presents the yearly evolution of the purchasing power 
of exports, defined as the terms of trade multiplied by the export 
quantum; this Table-also includes estimates for Cuba. After touching 
bottom in 1932 or 1933, recovery sets in culminating in 1936 or 1937, 
after which a new relapse occurs. By the late 1930s the purchasing 




Foreign Trade Indicators for Some Latin American Coi.mtries 
(1928-29 = 100) 
1932-33 1938-39 






El Salvador 55 50
Mexico 63 124
Venezuela 79 47 






El Salvador 96 115
Mexico 60 49
Venezuela 91 145
Peru 82 108 
&>Urces: Basic data obtained _from Naciones Unidas, America Latina:
Relacion de Precios del Intercambio, Cuadernos de la CEPAL, Santiago,
Chile, 1976. The terms of trade are defined as an index of dollar
export unit values to dollar import unit values. 
Table 2-A 
Purchasing Power of Exports, 1928-39 
(1929 = 100) 
~ntina Brazil Colombia Cuba Chile Ecuador El Salvador Mexico Peru Venezuela 
1928 110 97 111 101 91 114 110 94 - 74 
1929 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1930 67 67 82 68 62 91 60 · 63 66 110 
1931 69 62 Bo 57 41 64 67 49 48 71 
1932 65 54 72 43 16 68 40 35 43 74 
1933 58 59 63 45 25 50 77 39 52 48 
1934 74 70 85 50 38 82 67 56 71 61 
1935 78 71 73 56 42 64 6857 79 39 
1936 86 77 83 67 47 77 . 60 62 80 55 
1937 115 75 85 75 73 73 83 69 82 58 
1938 68 67 64 48 6419 53 67 68 58 
1939 76 71, so· 67 51 68 70 52 70 58 
Source: As 1n Table 1; Cuban purchasing power of exports obtained by·d1v1d1ng indices of the value 
of exports at current prices by the United States wholesale price index. Ba.sic data fran Ministerio 
de Hacienda, Direccion Nacional de Estadistica, Resumenes Estadisticos Seleccionados, La Ha.bana, 1959, 





The crisis disturbed the balance of payments also via the capital 
account. After 1930 gross capital infiows fell sharply. Furthenoore, 
with the dollar prices of exports dropping unexpectedly by around 60 
percent debt repayments rose in real terms, compressing the capacity 
to import beyond what is suggested in Table 2-A. Therefore, between 
1929 and 1932-33 the import quantum fell more than the purchasing power 
of exports, as ma.y be seen in Table 2-B (with the. exception of Mexico) • 
By 1934 all countries, except Argentina, had suspended normal servicing 
of the external national debt. Import volumes as a rLUe recovered 
much faster than the purchasing power of exports. Private portfolio 
capital was not.to play an important role in the external accounts 
of Latin American countries until the 1960s. 
D..lring the 1920s critics of the prevailing pro-trade orthodoxy 
within Latin .l\merica pointed to signs of grow:l.ne protection1sm.at the 
Center. In Britain, imperial preferences were advocated by influential 
groups; in the United States, the 1928 presidential election was accom­
panied by a protectionist wave. These trends culminated with the 
passage of the &noot-Hawley tariff in 1930, the British_Abnonnal 
Importations Act of 1931 and the Ottawa Corrrnonwealth preferences of 
1932. .The' Latin .American Periphery, unconsult.ed regarding these measures, 
could go hang. A North .American author writing in 1935 about southern 
cone countries in Latin America described the situation as follows: 
"'Ihe trade barriers which have been erected in Eurooe and the 
United States against ar;ricultural products and raw materials 
have placed these col..lr.tries in the forefront of foreign trade 
decline •••Nationalistic tendences are not dominant in these 
countries. National leaders fully recop.;nize the desirability 
of a heavy volume of trade •• National self-sufficiency to a greater 
and greater measure was forced upon these countries by the 




99!!J>ar1son of Purchasirlg Power of Exports (A) and Import Quantt.nn (B) 
(1929 = 100) 
1928-29 1930-31 1932-33 1934-35-36 1937-38-39 
Argentina A 105 68 62 79 86 
B 98 _75 . 49 59 . 74
Brazil A 99 .65 57 73 71 
B 100 49. 44 60 72
Colombia A 106 81 68 80 81 
B 109 49 ~4 . · 70 93
CUba A 101 63 44 58 69 
B 99 66 32 51 62
Chile A 96 52 21 4_2 57
B 90 70 18 35 49
Ecuador A 107 78 59 74 68 
B 100 67 43 76 77
El Salvador A 105 64 59 61 69 
B 95 50 45 55 54
Mexico A 97 56 37 62 63 
B 94 61 42 60 73
Peru A 100a 57 48 77 · 73 
B 100a 62 39 78 88
Venezuela A 87 91 61 52 58 
B 90 57 35 31 55 
8Rerers only to 1929 
Source: As 1n Table 2-A 
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'llle energence of a protectionist and nationalistic Center was 
perhaps the greatest ~hock to Latin American econanies during the 
early 1930s. The rnennry of this betrayal of Ricardo would last longer 
1n the Periphery than in the Center. 
Policies 
An ex-post description of measures taken by a group of La.tin 
.American countries during the early 1930s risks attributing to 
"Autonanous Policy" a series of improvisations more or less forced by 
circumstances. Yet not all countries were in a position to improvise. 
· 'Ille largest ones, such as Argentina, Brazil., Colombia_ and Mexico, 
were at the forefront of experimentation. The smallest countries, 
such as Guatemala, Hal.ti and the Dcminican Republic did little but 
wa1t for export-led recove!"J. In between there is an interesting contrast 
between Cuba, which was dragged down by the crisis as surely as the 
Mississippi., versus.Chile and Uruguay, which in spite of their small­
ness broke away from the orthodoxy of the gold-exchange standard and 
free trade. 
Unfortunately, data for those years are scanty, particularly for 
the small or passive countries. There is enough infonnation., ·however, 
to document several of the measures taken by the large or active countries. 
By the end of 1931 -the active nations were experimenting with the 
balance of payments measures previously regarded as heterodox •.W As con­
vertibility into gold was abandoned, exchange rates depreciated, par-
. . .. 
ticularly those applied to irrports. . Table 3 presents indices of those 
. . . . . . 
exchange r~tes, defined as units of local cUITency per one U.S. dollar. 
'Ille rates have been deflated by each country's cost-of-living index 
(or other available general index) relative to the U.S. cost of living 
index. The real depreciations relative to the dollar for the countries 
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Table 3 
Average Real Import Exchange Rates 
(1929 = 100) 
1925-29 1930-34 1935-39
Argentina 101.5 137.2 133.2
Brazil 100.2 173.2 186.0
Chile 100.5a 186.7 175.3
Colombia 98.8 145.6 158.6
Mexico 103.0 136.4 140.0 
Peru 98.6b 153.8 153.1 ·
Uruguay 101.3 155.8 160.3 
~fers only to 1928 and 1929 
bRefers only to 1926, 1927, 1928, and 1929 
Sources and method: For definitions see text. Basic data 
obtained from League of Nations yearbooks 
and national sources. 
shown range from 36 percent to 87 percent. The depreciation trend 
appears to have been unaffected by whether a cotmtry was politically 
rooving Left (Mexico, Colombia) or Right (Argentina, Uruguay). 
As may be deduced from Table 4, most of the swing in the real 
import exchange rates arose fran norrd.nal depreciations, which had a 
surprisingly small effect on price levels. Nevertheless, for all 
cotmtries shovm, price indices for 1935-39 were hi€:J1er than that 
of the USA. 
For the passive cotmtries one may conjecture that there was no 
such_ real depreciation of the import exchange rates. Sane of these 
cotmtries (Cuba, Panama) did not even have a Central Bank,while 
_others (Guatemala, Haiti) maintained their peg to the U.S. dollar 
throughout the crisis and on the whole rema:1ned conmitted to gold­
exchange standard rules. 
'lhe real depreciation of the Argentine peso during the 1930s 
can_ be doc1..1m=nted roore fully_ !'ran three additional angles : when 
other deflators are used, with respect to the British potmd, and for 
the export rate. Table 5 presents these .. calculations. It may be 
noted that the real depreciation is smaller when wholesale price 1ndices 
are used as defiators, a not surprising result when consider1ng the 
heavier weight of tradable goods in that index in contrast with cost 
of living indices. For 1930-33 the depreciation is larger with respect 
to the dollar than to the potmd; for later years this is reversed when 
cost of l~ving indices are used as defiators. After 1933 a gap appears 
between import and export rates, but the most remarkable fact in the 
light of later experience.is that the real average export rate does not 
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Table 4 
Cost of Living Indices 
(1929 = 100) 





























USA 101.4 83.9 81.6 
8Rerers only to 1928 and 1929 
bRefers only to 1926, 1927, 1928, and 1929 
Sources and method: As in Table 3 
Table~ 
Atwntine Aver8$!ft Real Exchange Rates, 1925-1939 · 
(1929 = 100) 
IX>llar Potmd Sterl~ 
Cost of Livin,:r, Wholesale Prices Cost.of Living Wholesale Prices 
Imports Exports Imports ~orts Imports Exports . Imports ~orts 
1925-29 101.6 - - 99.5a - 102.3 - - 101.5a . 
193~33 135.1 - - 112.9 126.7 - - 100.7 
1934-36 139.7 124.2 117.9 105.0 160.7 143.1 115.8 103.1 
1937-39 131.3 120.0 109.2 100.4 147.6 135.4 113.1 103.9 
8Refers to 1926-29·on1y 
Sources: "Exchange rates and terms of trade in the Argentine Republic, 1913-1976" 





appreciate in spite of gloorey world market conditions. Special taxes 
and trading aITangeIIEnts becarre conmonplace for traditional exports, 
but the maintenance of a reasonable real export exchange rate left 
the door open for new nontraditional exports when external circumstances 
pennitted. 
Exchange rate devaluations were not the only :rreasures undertaken 
by the active countries to restore balance of payments equilibrium: 
there was also increased tariffs, irrport and exchange controls and, as 
noted for Argentina, nw.tiple exchange rates. . Contrary to what would . 
happen in the late 1940s and 1950s, exchange rate and protectionist 
policies reinforced each other as import-repressing mechanisms. Indeed, 
by the mid-1930s in many of the active countries there may have been 
sore redundancy in this fonn:idable battery of measures; P.T. Ellsworth 
has argued this.point in his valuable study of Chile in depression. 91 
For the Colombian case, David S.C. Chu has argued that most of the 
change between 1927 and 1936 in the price of imported nontraditional 
manufactures was due to the devaluation of the peso rather than tariff 
10/ · increases.- This does not deny that for some industries increases 
in effective protection played an important stimulative role; examples 
for Colombia include cement, soap, and rayon textiles. 
'Ihe small passive countries appear to have been as inpotent 
regarding protection as with exchange rate management. Cuba actually 
lowered tariffs in 1934, undoing much of the protectionist effect of 
the anana.lous Tariff Act of 1927. 'lhis action was undertaken as part 
of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1934 with the United States; the United 
States lowered tariffs for 35 Cuban products while Cuba granted reductions 
on 426 1terns. The United States Jones-Costigan Sugar Act of 1934 
inposed quotas on imports from Cuba, although setting a premium 
over the prevailing world price to assure deliveries and protect pro­
ducers in the United States. The Cuban share of the U.S. sugar 
market was 52 percent during 1926-30, falling to 29 percent in 1935-39. 
'Ihe U.S. share in all Cuban imports rose fran 60 percent in 1926-30 
to 68 percent in 1935-39.111 Even larger countries were pressured 
into reversing some of their early tariff increases; wielding the 
threat of Corrm::>nwealth preferences and import quotas on rneat,the United 
Kingda~ obtained tariff concessions from Argentina under the contro­
versial Roca-Runciman treaty of 1933. Argentine tariff revenues 
expressed as·a percentage of the value of merchandise imports, which 
had increased from 17 percent in 1929 to 29 percent in 1933, fell 
121to 22-23 percent in subsequent years. Several Iatin .American 
countries, on the other hand, met Japanese canpetition in textiles 
w1th a vigorous use of import duties and quotas. 
Abandonment of convertibility sterrrned the decline in m:>ney 
supplies i-mich occurred even in active countries during the -early stages 
of the crisis. By the late 1930s, nx:mey supplies in active countries 
exceeded 1929 levels. Table 6 contrasts the CUban case, where money 
supply shrank by about 40 percent,with those of Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay. Interest rates for 1935-39 
appear lower than those rep.;istered at the height of the crisis (1930-32), 
and lower.than those of the late 1920s. In Argentina, for example, 
interest rates on 90 days tine deposits.were 6 percent at the end of 
1929; averar;ed 4.3 percent during 1930-32; and oscillated between 2 and 
3 percent for the rest of the decade. 
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Table 6 
Ncminal Money Supply 
(1929 = 100) 
1925-29 1930-34 1935-39 
Argentina 100.oa 90.6 110.8 
Bt-azil 91.9 108.8 175.0 
Uruguay 90.7 103.2 130.4 
Chile 97.8b 109.0 213.4 
Colanbia lll.O 92.6 159.0 
Mexico 86.l 97.i 211.2 
CUba 107.6 56.7 60.9 
United States 98.5 83.0 117.0 
8Refers only to 1926, 1927, 1928, and 1929 
bRefers only to 1928 and 1929 
Sources and method: Cuban data from Henry C. Wallich, ~tary Problems 
of an Export Economy: The Cuban Experience 1914-1917, Cambridge, Harvard 
· University Press, 1950, pp. 38-T6 and 152. Chilean data :f'ran P.T. Ellsworth, 
2E_ cit, p. 171. United States data from Appendix A, Table A-1, in Milton 
Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz,. A Monetary History of the United 
States, 1867-1960, Princeton, Pr:inceton University Press, 1963. Mexican 
data from Leopoldo Solis, I.a Realidad Economica Mexicana: Retrovision y 
Perspectivas, Mexico DF, Siglo XX, 1970, pp. 104-105. Others from national 
sources. Data refer to money supplies at the end of the yea:r. Definitions 
of the stock of money vary slightly from country to country; definitions 
are closest to "t•1i_". 
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'Ihere has been some controversy as to whether the active countries. 
followed, during the early 1930s, fiscal policies which could be 
characterized as 'Keynesiani~before-Keynes. ' The argwnent has 
been most lively for Brazil, and centers on the magnitude of planned 
fiscal deficits and their financing. In his pioneering work Celso 
Furtado argued that dcrnestic coffee price-support programs led to 
fiscal deficits having an expansionary effect on aggregate demand. 
later research noted that much of this expenditure was financed either 
by new·taxes·or foreign loans.131 It now appears that in Brazil 
as well as in other countries, the.authorities remained on the whole 
coomitted to fiscal orthodoxy, certainly during the early 1930s. 
Large fiscal deficits financed by m:>ney creation occurred, but as a 
result of unusual political circumstances, such as the Sao Paulo 
rebellion in 1932; political tunnoil in Chile during late 1931 and 
1932, including a short-lived socialist government; the war between 
Peru and Colombia over Leticia in 1932; and the Second Ch aco War between 
Bolivia and Paraguay, also in 1932. In some countries. fiscal orthodoxy 
was buttressed by rnerrories of massive public works and deficit~financing 
during the 1920s by corrupt governments, such as the dictatorships of 
Leguia in Peru and Machado in Cuba. 
Even if there is little evidence that the full-employment fiscal 
surplus was reduced to maintain aggregate demand, in m:>st activist 
countries public expenditures seem to have been reduced by less., or 
expanded more, than private expenditures. The share of government in 
GNP rose in all active countries during the 1930s. On the revenue side 
there were important changes with the share of custan taxes falling, 
as may be seen in the following data for Argentina and Brazil:1~1 · 
-17-
Custom revenues as percentage 
total current revenues 
~ntina Brazil 
1925-29 58 51 
1930-34 44 43 
1935-39 33 42 
Both Argentina and Brazil witnessed a remarkable expansion 
1n non-customs current public revenues, which by 1932 (Argentina) and 
1933 (Brazil) exceeded the levels reached 1n 1929,at current prices. 
One may conjecture that fiscal policy 1n active cotmtries exerted 
at least a modest balanced-budget-multiplier type of expansionary effect 
on aggregate demand during the early 1930s. During the second half of 
the decade such an effect was reinforced by a cautious increase in domes­
tically-financed deficits, a process encouraged by increasingly self­
confident cheap-money policies isolated frc:m the rest of the ~orld by 
exchange controls. 
The rising share of public expenditure in GNP had more than Keynesian 
significance. Governments became carmitted to promoting both growth 
and structural tra."1.sforrnation. The Lazaro Cardenas administration (1934-
1940), for ex~le, accelerated the la.'1d reform program of the Mexican 
Revolution,and 1n 1938 nationalized the petroleum industry. Governmental 
regulatory functions expanded; the 1930s also witnessed the strengthening 
and creation of public institutions granting medium and long-term credits, 
although the large-scale public involvenent in industrial credit was to 
wait tmtil the 1940s•. In an interesting conjecture, Fernando Henrique 
cardoso and Enzo Faletto have argued that.in countries where the export 
economy was controlled by national groups that had succeeded in fonning 
an 1Jrl)orta11t :industrial sector before the crisis, danestic policies took 
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on a more pro-private-enterprise cast, while in countries where exports 
were controlled ma.inly by foreign-owned enclaves the state took a more 
active role after the crisis relative to private enterprise. But 
the private sector was not excluded from economies where state par­
ticipation was preponderant, nor was the public sector absent in the 
initial stages of import substituting industrial1zation, even in countries 
of liberal tradition.151 
Governments and public opinion showed a keener interest in 
increasing the national share in value added by forei~-owned activities; 
those enterprises also came under closer scrutiny and supervision by 
host countries. Some traditional export activities witnessed a rise 
1n the share owned by danestic capitalists; that was the case, for 
example, for Cuban sugar. 
We can now summarize the automatic and policy-induced mechanisms 
of adjustI?Ent triggered by the exogenous shocks Iatin America received 
during 1929-33. The increase in the international orice of manufactures 
relative to that for primary products, which was expected to continue 
for the foreseeable future, by itself encouraged the expansion of domestic 
manufacturing at the expense of rural activities. But besides manufactured 
inportables and primary exportables, the Iatin American econan;y of the 
1930s had a third category of goods which may be called non-traded. 
Regardless of the exchange rate policy followed, a small country subject 
to an exogenous worsening of _its international ternis of trade will 
witness over the lor.p; run a decline in the price of its non-traded goods 
relative to. the price of 1rnportable goods, further encouraging a rnove­
nent of resources toward the import c~ting sector. Under a gold­
exchange standard with fixed rates and with collapsing international prices 
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for both imports and exports non-traded prices will have a long wey 
to fall; such denation is likely to be protracted and painful. 
Countries willing and able to devalue their exchange rate can nnve 
towan:1 the new constellation of relative prices speedily, lim:1ting 
both price and monetary deflation. This is what the active Lat:in 
.American countries managed to do by 1931 at the latest, while 
passive countries allowed price and monetary denation to run its 
course. '!he real exchange rates shO\m :1n Table 3 can be taken as proxies 
for the domestic price of jn;)ortable goods relative to the non-traded 
goods price. It is only a proXY because it does not take into account 
increzrents :1n protection, due either to tariffs or quantitative re­
strictions, while using the United States cost of liv:ing as an :indicator 
of international prices for Latin American importable goods. While 
the.neglect of protection underestimates the increase :1n the relative 
price of jmportables, the second consideration probably contributes 
toward overestim3.tion. 
Policy makers who permitted budget deficits, abandoned gold 
convertibility,and allowed the exchange rate to depreciate did so, 
on the whole, moved by survival instincts rather than inspired. by the 
writings of economists, either defunct or live. But in sane countries 
· the :institutional structure was compatible with those actions, while 
1n others it was not. 
Performance 
'!he 1930s belong to the pre-national accounts era. Table 7 pulls 
together available ex-post estimates for G.D.P. growth during the 1930s 
and 1940s. 'Ihe four largest Lat:1n American countries ( /1.rgentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, and Mexico) do register growth rates superior to those of 
canacta and the U.S.A. for the 1930s. Neither the absolute G.D.P. 
growth for the 1930s nor its level relative to the growth achieved 
during the 1940s, however, are irq:>ressive. In the cases of Argentina 
· and Colombia, G.D.P. seems to have expanded during the 1920s at 
clearly faster rates than those shown for the 1930s. For Brazil, 
the major source used in Table 7 indicates an annual GDP growth rate 
marginally higher for 1920-29 than for 1929-39; for Mexico the opposite 
is the case cofTl)aring 1921-29 with 1929-39. 
MeasureIIEnts of Gross tomestic Product do not take into account 
losses of real income arising from deteriorating tenns of trade. If 
these were taken into account, the aggregate Latin .American performance 
during the 1930s would look worse relative to those within the region 
for the 1920s and 1940s, as well as in comparison with the industrialized 
countries during the 1930s. 
Table 8 subdivides the evolution of GDP into four plausible periods: 
crisis (1929-33), recovery (1933-39), war (1939-45) and postwar (1945-49). 
It can be argued that in several Latin .American countries recovery started 
before 1933; data, however, do not waITant much preoccupation at this 
stage with turning points. Table 8 indicates that for the four largest 
Latin American countries neither the crisis nor the recovery were as 
sharp as those in Canada and the U.S.A. It should be borne in mind that 
value added in rural activities made up a large share of GDP in those 
days; even for Argentina, the country with the highest e:.!:. capita incane, · 
. 
rural activities made up nearly one quarter-of GDP in 1929, according 
to the major source used 1n Tables 7 and 8. 
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Table 7 
Real Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost 
(Average annual percentage rates of change) 
1929-39 1939-49 
Argentina 1.6% 3.0% 
Brazil 3.0 3.8 
Chile oa 3.3d 
Colombia 3.8 3.7 
Honduras -1.0 3.8 
Mexico 2.1 5.9 
Uruguay l.Ob 3.4 
0.3 4.5USAc 
canactac 0.5 5.5 
8Refers to 1929-40 
bRefers to 1930-39 
~fers to Gross National Product 
~fers to 1940-49 
Sources: Basic data for An?;ei1tina, Brazil, Chile (1940-49), Colombia, 
Honduras, Mexico., Urur;:;ua_y (1939-49) obtained from: Naciones Unidas, 
Cuadernos de la CEPAL, Series Historicas del Crecimiento de ftmerica 
Latina, Santiago de Chile, 1978. 
Basic data for Uruguay (1930-39) obtained from: Julio Millot, Carlos 
Silva, Lindor Silva, El Desarrollo Industrial del Uruguay; de la 
crisis de 1929 a la posp.:ueITa, Montevideo., Universidad de la Republica., 
Institute de Econornia., 1972., p.251., Cuadro #23. 
Basic data for the USA obtained from: Council of Economic Advisers., 
Economic Report of the President, U.S. Government Printing Office., 
Washinc,nton, D.C. 1974. 
Basic data for Canada obtained from: M.C. Urquhart and K.A.H. Buckley., 
editors., Historical Statistics of Canada, Cambridge: At the University . 
Press, 19b5, pp. 132 and 475. · · · 
Basic data for Chile (1929-40) refers to an index for "aggregate" output, 
made up by five basic sectors which during 1950-57 made up about one half 
of Chilean GNP. See Marto A. Ballesteros and Tool E. Davis, "The Growth of 
Oltput and Employment in Basic Sectors of the Chilean Econany., 1908-195711, 
F.conanic Development and Cultural Chane;e, Vol..Xl, No.2,Part.I,Jan.1963,pp.152-177 
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Table 8 
Peal Gross Domestic Product, At Factor Cost 
(Total percentage changes) 
1929-33 1933-39 1939-45 1945-49 
Argentina -9.7% 29.2% 13.2% 18.9% 
Brazil 2.6 31.6 15.0 26.5 
Colombia 9.9 31.6 16.8 23.3 
Honduras -8.6 -2.0 23.1 18.6. 
Mexico -10.3 37.2 43.3 24.o 
Uruguay na na 10.4 26.1 
Chileb -36.9 50.6 33.3 9.9 
USAa -30.5 48.o 69.6 -8.8 
Ganadaa -29.8 50.0 63.1 5.1 
¾fers to Real Gross National Product 
buntil 1945, Chilea~ data refers to the Ballesteros-Davis index 
for "aggregate" output, made up by five basic sectors which during 
1950-57 made up about one half of the Chilean GNP. 
na = Data not available. 
Sources: As in Table 7. 
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Econanic performance during the 1930s for at least the largest 
Latin American countries looks roore impressive when attention is 
focussed on manufacturing. While manufacturing growth during the 
1940s exceeded that for the 1930s in roost countries, as shown in 
Table 9; the Latin American growth rates clearly exceed those of 
Canada and the USA for the 1930s.161 In the important case of Brazil, 
manufacturing growth during the 1930s was significantly higher than 
during the 1920s (not shown); Colanbian industrialization in the 
1930s could not have been nuch behind the pace of the 1920s, if at 
all. 
It is generally accepted that pre-1929 Latin .Ameri~an manufacturing 
grew pari passu with the rest of the basically export-oriented economy. 
Beyond sane moderate protectionism, public policy departed little from 
a neutral' attitude toward industry. Irrportant segJnents·of manufacturing 
relied directly on the export of (slightly) processed primary products; 
exarrples include TIEat-packing plants in the River Plate and sugar mills 
in several countries. Growth of manufacturing during the recovery phase 
of the 1930s relied overnhelmingly on import substitution. Comparing 
Tables 10 and 8 it may be seen that manufacturing expansion far exceeded 
that of GDP during 1933-39; note that this was not the case for Canada . ··- , 
and the USA. Also in contrast with those two industrialized countries, 
manufacturing growth during 1933-39 for roost Latin American countries 
shown in Table 10 exceeded.that achieved during-the war. 
If there was an engine of growth in Latin .America during the 1930s, 
that engine was· import substituting industrialization. Not surprisingly, 
the uneven perfonnance by different ·sectors implied by such a proposition 
can also be found within manufacturing. Even as sane manufacturing 
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Table 9 
Real Manufacur.:tnr; Output at Factor Cost 
(Average Annual Percentage Rates of Change) 
1929-39 1939-49 
Argentina 3.1% 3.5% 
Brazil 5.0 1.2 
Chile 3.3c 4.8 
Colanbia 8.8 6.7 
Honduras 1.4 6.1 
Mexico 4.3 7-5 
Uruguay 5.2b 5-7 
Cuba -1-~ -4. 8 
-0.6 6.1USAa 
canaaaa o.8 7.5 
~fers to Index of Total Manufacturing Output· 
bRefers to 1930-39 
~fers to 1927-39 
~fers to 1930-39 
Sources: Basic data for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, 
and Uruguay (1939-49) as in Table 7. Basic data for Uruguay (1930-39) 
also as in Table 7. 
Ba.sic data for Chile obtained frcm: Oscar Munoz G., Crec1rn1ento Industrial 
de Chile 1914-1965, Santiago, Uriiversidad de Chile,·Instituto de Econamia 
y Planificacion, 1968, pp. 160-161. 
Ba.sic data for the USA and Cru1ada obtained as in Table 7 
Ba.sic data for Cuba obtained from Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, "An index of Cuban 
industrial output, 1930-5811 , Chapter 3 in J.W. Wilkie and K. Ruddle, editors, 
Quantitative Latin Ai~rican Studies , .Methods and Fincliw,s, Los ~eles, 
UCLA La.tin .American Center Publications, 1977, Table 3-7, p.52. The index 
refers to total industrial production. 
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Table 10 
Real Manufacturing Output, At Factor Cost 
(Total Percentage Changes) 
1929-33 1933-39 1939-45 1945-49 
Argentina -6.5% 44.7% 23.5% 14.6%
Brazil 1.3 60.4 36.0 47.4
Colanbia 24.8 86.0 34.8 42.0
Honduras -13.2 32.5 31.8 37.2
MeXico -7.9 65.3 71.0 20.8
Uruguay na na 22.6 41.6
Chile -6.4 37.7 34.7 18.5
Cuba -50.0b 73.4 29.0 23.7 
USAa -38.6 53.6 98.3 -9.2
Canadaa -33.2 61.5 90.8 7.6 
8Refers to Index of Total Manufacturing Output 
bluffers to 1930-33 
Sources: Basic data for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico,
and Uruguay obtained as in Table 7. 
Ba.sic data for Chile obtained from: Oscar Munoz G., 2E. cit, pp. 160-161,
(for 1939-49); and from M.A. Ballesteros and T.E. Davis, op cit, pp. 160-61
(for 1929-39). 
Ba.sic data for USA and Canada as in Table 7.
Ba.sic data for Cuba as 1n Table 9 
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activities closely dependent on pre-1929 export-oriented prosperity 
were shrinking, other activities (sanetimes a handful) made dramatic 
output advances during the 1930s. Such lea.dine sectors typically 
included textiles, building materials (especially cement), petroleum 
refining, tires, toiletries and food processing for the bane market • 
.Aroong these activities, textiles appear as quantitatively the most 
inportant, often providing nnre than 20 percent of the net expansion of 
value added in manufacturing and growing at annual rates above 10-percent 
during the 1930s. The main exception seems to have been Brazil., where 
earlier industrialization in the consumer goods sectors of textiles, 
shoes, clothing and foodstuffs meant that during the 1930s the rost 
rapidly growing industries were those producing intennediate and 
capital goods. 171 
'lhe industrialization drive of the 1930s seems to have been quite 
labor-intensive and based on small and medium sized finns, many newly 
created. It has been est:1ma.ted, for example, that fran 1930 to 1937 
total industrial errployment in Sao Paulo grew at a rate of 10.9 percent 
18/per year; the output elasticity of employment was cµJout one.- Real 
wages appear to have been relatively constant in most coi.mtries., with 
the stagnant primary sector providing an aJll)le reservoir of workers and 
also on the whole an elastic supply of foodstuffs. This view is 
consistent with the changes 1n relative prices noted earlier, with 
both the prices of exportable and non-traded goods falling relative 
to those of inportable goods, w1th prices for exportable goods falling 
the most. 
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'Ihe industrialization drive squeezed installed capacity; there 
are frequent reports of textile mills working two and three shifts 
even in the early 1930s. In the Brazilian and Peruvian cases the 
mediocre 1920s left substantial excess capacity. Statistics do not 
show an upsurge in imports of machinery and equipment, although one 
may conjecture that there were substantial changes in the canposition 
of these imports between the 1920s and 1930s. 
'!here are indications that the import-substituting drive relied 
heavily on new entrepreneurs, including fresh inrnigrants fran the 
troubled Europe of the 1930s. 'l'here was direct foreign investment in 
inport-substitution,191 but its role seems relatively smaller than 
l'lha.t was to be in later years. 
Internationally canparable data are available for the cement 
industry, which in sane ways can be taken as representative of the 1930s 
industrial success stories (although it was mre capital-intensive and 
foreign-dominated than the textile industry). Table 11 presents apparent 
cerrent consumption first; on the whole, it confirms the hypothesis 
that larger and active countries perfonned better than North America 
and than smaller and passive Latin American countries, even if the 
irrplied annual growth rate of apparent consumption is far from spec­
tacular. What is spectacular is the evolution of the share of con­
sumption supplied domestically, shown in the last two columns, and 
the implied growth rates in cement prcx:luction between 1928-29 and 
1937-38. During those nine years cement output multiplied by mre 
than 14 times in Colanbia, by IIDre than"6 t1rnes in.Brazil and by 
al.m:)st 4 t1rnes in Argentina. By 1937-38 the large and active Latin 
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Table 11 
CenEnt: Consumption and Output 
Apparent CerrEnt D:mestic Output 




Argentina 153 37 92 
Brazil 112 16 91 
Chile 114 43 99 
Colanbia 118 6 74 
Mexico 148 88 97 
Peru 136 46 66 
Uruguay 77 81 90 
CUba 34 93 93 
I.:aninican Republic 74 0 0 
Haiti 58 0 0 
Central American Republics (six) 100 12 11 
canada 51 
USA 63 
Source: Basic data in physical magnitudes obtained from the European 
CerrEnt Association, ~-Cement ~ket in Fi~es, Paris 1974. 
Apparent consumption refers to cement production plus imports less exports. 
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American countries had becane practically self-sufficient in cement. 
Such rapid transfonnation., incidentally, leaves one a bit puzzled 
as to the ba.ITiers to greater local cement production during 1928-29 
in countries such as Brazil and Colombia., especially in contrast with 
the Cuban and Mexican cases. Proximity to the USA may have encouraged 
greater direct foreign.investment in cement in the last two countries 
before the Great Depression. 
Changes in income distribution during the 1930s are unclear. 
In the industrial sector higher prices for in:port-cc:mpeting goods. 
canbined with a fairly elastic labor supply must have generated large 
profits. Yet in:portant redistributive structural changes occurred in 
the rural sectors of a number of countries, partly induced by the 
weakening of traditional land-intensive exports. Thorp and Bertram 
note that in Peru with the decline of the landowners' authority there 
was an increase in the equality of the distribution of rural income; 
a similar trend appears to have taken place in Cuba. The acceleration 
1n the Mexican land reform has already been noted; in Colanbia the Alfonso 
Lopez administration carried out less drama.tic but significant land 
20/and tax ref0IT.1S .-
To si.mnarize regarding performance: during the 1930s large and 
active Latin .Arrerican economies showed an in:pressive capacity to 
transform, generating new leading sectors within manufacturing. By 
the late 1930s those economies had becane m:::,re self-reliant; 1n spite 
of GDP growth., in:port volumes (with 1928-29=100) by 1938-39 had 
dropped to 72 in Argentina, 7D 1n Brazil, 87 in Colanbia, 56 in Chile., 
and 72 1n Mexico (data as in Table 1). The perfonnance of small 
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and passive economies seems to have been poorer. Even though traces 
of response to the new constellation of international prices can 
also be seen in those econanies, and although they appear to have 
also engaged in some :irq:>ort substitution (even in Cuba import-replacing 
activities such as milk-processing and cotton cloth expanded rapidly) 
those efforts were weak relative to both the depressive forces 
originating in their primary sectors and to the industrialization 
drives of the active and large countries. In those small countries 
with a large and flexible subsistence sector, in Central .America 
the welfare consequences of this involution were better than in Cuba, 
where the rural sector provided little roan for those unemployed in 
export and related activities. It may also be noted that sane small 
countries which were then outright colonies, such as Jamaica, Puerto 
Rico, and the Phillipines benefitted fran 1930s metropolitan pro­
tectionism. 'Ihus Puerto Rican and Phillipino sugar exports rose while 
those of Cuba sank, and Jamaican banana exports to Britain gained at 
the expense of those frcm Central America. 
'lhere is truth in the assertion that the Latin American countries 
which performed reasonably well during the 1930s were those which had 
large domestic markets and some pre-1929 industrial base, as in the 
cases of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. But this fails to 
explain the contrasting performance of Chile and Uruguay, on one side, 
versus that of Cuba. 'lhese three countries in 1929 had reached 
roughly s1milar levels of population and income. In contrast with 
Chile and Uruguay, however, Cuba did not have a·Central Bank during 
the 1930s, maintained its currency rigidly pegged to the U.S. dollar 
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and, as already noted, actually lowered tariffs 1n 1934. One may 
conclude that a m1n1rnum size in the danestic market plus a m1n1rnum 
degree of autonany regarding the exchange rate, fiscal and monetary 
policies were necessary conditions for industrialization during the 
1930s 1n Latin America. 
Final Observations 
The key role given in this paper to the exchange rate as a 
variable which can st:1mulate growth and avoid monetary deflation may 
be found 1n the literature, both for Latin America and elsewhe~. 
l-11.lton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz have noted that from 1929 
. ' 
to 1931 China was hardly affected internally by the crisis; China 
had a silver standard which was equivalent to a floating exchange rate 
with respect to gold-staridard countries. I'Ur.ing 1929-31 its currency 
luckily depreciated, a situation reversed When Britain and then the 
. 21/
United States abandoned the gold standard.- The silver standard 
had served well countries adhering to it 1n an earlier Great Depression; 
during 1873-94 incane grew significantly rrore rapidly 1n silver-
standard countries than in those adhering to the gold standard.
221 
'Ihe good perfonnance of the Swedish econany during the 1930s has been 
credited in part to the large depreciation of the krona in 1931.
231 
fudley Seers used a typology similar to that used in this paper to discuss 
I.atin American economic perfonnance during 1929-58, grouping together 
eleven countries followinp; a dollar exchange standard, which con­
sistently had high dollar or gold backing for the local currency 
and littie exchange control. He also notes that governments of these 
countries made only sparing use of import quotas or tariffs, partly 
because the application of trade controls was restricted by various 
reciprocaJ. agreerrents w1th the United States.2lV 
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Most mainstream economists, whether of the 1930 or 1980 vintage, 
would be inclined to give Latin American countries policy advice 
based on international trade and finance nod.els using the small 
country assumption. Trade theory asserts that a truly small country 
facing perfectly elastic demands and supplies for its exports and 
inports, respectively, should follow the same trade policy, e.g., 
free trade, regardless of what is going on in the rest of the world. 
Uncertainty as to the tenns of trade will not change matters ITn.lch 
unless one is willing to attribute to govenirrent insights unavailable 
to the private sector. International f:inance theory adds that a 
small country will (and should) have little control over exchange 
rate and ronetary policy; pegging to a key currency and following 
'gold-exchange standard' monetary rules,includ1ng free convertibility, 
are the usual prescriptions for the small, regardless of external 
circumstances. 
Like Walrasian auction markets, smallness in foreign trade and 
finance is a powerful theoretical construct which may be more insightful 
in sane circumstances than others. In a world of trade quotas, 
convertibility restrictions or foreign tariffs which are ~osed 
depending on the success of one's export.drives, it could be that not 
· even Andorra is srnall. Optimum currency area theory, stiITn.llating as 
it is, gives little practical guidance for drawing the line between 
small pereers and large flexers. The Latin .American experience. of the 1930s 
shows that smallness in foreign trade and finance is not an intrinsic 
and permanent characteristic of a country, but a result of specific 
conditions in the world econorey and changing danestic circumstances. 
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Foreign trade and payrrents policy for a Latin American-type econcrny 
should depend on what is expected to happen in (and on unexpected 
shocks caning frcm)the rest of the world. 
'!he fine-tuning of international trade and financial policies 
could lead to extreme protectionism and the loss of ''nnneyness" for 
the national currency. Many Latin American countries during the 
1940s and 1950s carried to excess policies initiated during the 1930s, 
even as world markets became roore buoyant. But the advice that 
developing countries.should design their trade and financial. policies 
as if the state of the world economy did not matter (or as if they 
were small at all times) suggests evangelical fervor rather than 
scientific analysis or historical knowledge. 
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until rnid-1931" (p. 179). 
9/ P.T. Ellsworth, Chile: An Econany in Transition, New York: The 
Macmillan COIJ1)any, 1945, p.67. In the preface to his book, Ellsworth 
remarks that his interest in CrJ.le was aroused while teaching mechanisms 
of adjustm:nt to balance of payments disturbances (p.vii). In the 
United Kingdom tariffs had been advocated before the abandonment 
of the gold standard as an alternative to depreciation; after 1931 
both tariffs and a depreciated potmd (with respect to the U.S. dollar) 
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